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Abstract: 
Findings from 162 researchers in 73 teams testing the same hypothesis with the same data reveal a 
universe of unique analytical possibilities leading to a broad range of results and conclusions. 
Surprisingly, the outcome variance mostly cannot be explained by variations in researchers’ modeling 
decisions or prior beliefs. Each of the 1,261 test models submitted by the teams was ultimately a unique 
combination of data-analytical steps. Because the noise generated in this crowdsourced research mostly 
cannot be explained using myriad meta-analytic methods, we conclude that idiosyncratic researcher 
variability is a threat to the reliability of scientific findings. This highlights the complexity and 
ambiguity inherent in the scientific data analysis process that needs to be taken into account in future 
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Organized scientific knowledge production has institutionalized checks such as editorial vetting, peer-
review, and methodological standards(1, 2) to ensure that findings are independent from the 
characteristics or predispositions of any single researcher. These procedures should generate inter-
researcher reliability offering consumers of scientific findings assurance that they are not arbitrary 
flukes but that other researchers would generate similar findings given the same data. Recent meta-
science challenges this assumption. Attempts to reproduce other researchers’ computations, make 
alternative model specifications and conduct replications with new data often lead to results differing 
substantially from original studies(3, 4). In response, scientists are paying more attention to 
institutionalized and procedural sources of bias, for example the interplay of structural incentives and 
psychological predispositions(5–7).  
 
We argue that noise in the research process is also a product of the researchers themselves when faced 
with a universe of analytical flexibility. We highlight this finding based on a comparatively well-defined 
data analysis task for highly skilled and accuracy-motivated social scientists testing the same hypothesis 
with the same data. The resulting idiosyncratic unexplained variability suggests there is great 
complexity and uncertainty inherent to the process of data analysis and conclusion drawing that exists 
independently of any perverse or biasing structural incentives. 
 
Researcher Variability 
What appear as seemingly trivial steps in data analysis(8, 9) may introduce variability and influence 
research outcomes to a limited extent(10). Yet as these steps accumulate across an entire workflow, 
outcomes could vary dramatically. Thus every step of the research process should be seen as non-trivial 
because researcher variability occurs where we expect the highest levels of inter-researcher reliability: 
the generation of numerical results from an existing dataset with pre-specified independent and 
dependent variables. 
 
Normally, we understand procedural bias as deriving from competencies or psychological 
predispositions in researchers that are activated when confronted with a multiplicity of data-analytic 
options(10, 11) when traversing through the “garden of forking paths”(8). Differences in competencies 
are, for example, methodological and topical expertise and how these influence subjective judgments. 
Confirmation bias means that preexisting attitudes and beliefs lead researchers to make analytical 
choices that generate certain outcomes and justify these choices post-hoc. We suggest that idiosyncratic 
factors provide a third explanation independent of competencies or psychological biases. These are the 




Identifying variability resulting from perverse incentives, model dependence and analytical robustness 
is nothing new(9, 10, 12, 13), but scientists only recently began systematic assessment of the 
phenomenon by observing researchers in ecologically realistic yet controlled settings using ‘many 
analysts’ approaches. For instance, when 29 researchers tested if soccer referees were biased toward 
darker skin players using the same data, 29 unique model specifications were reported with empirical 
results ranging from modestly negative to strongly positive(14). Most of these studies were small in 
scale(15–17), aimed at investigating the reliability of narrow, field-specific methods(15, 18, 19) or were 
conducted in a research environment deliberately obtuse from involved researchers’ substantive 
knowledge and foci(14). Here, we report findings from a large-scale crowdsourced research effort 
examining whether and to what degree variations in researchers’ competencies, potential psychological 
biases and concomitant analytic steps affect the reliability of reported scientific findings using a 
common hypothesis and well-known international survey data. 
 
Design 
We (the principal investigators, “PIs”: Breznau, Rinke, Wuttke) designed a study to make these 
devilishly-difficult-to-observe aspects of the analytical process observable: We coordinated a large 
group of data analysts (“participants”) to simultaneously, yet independently, test a common and 
contested hypothesis in social science: whether immigration reduces support for social policies among 
the public(20). 
 
Participants were given six survey questions to analyze opinions about different social policies from 
the International Social Survey Programme, a long-running, high-quality, multi-country survey widely 
used in the social sciences (see Communications in Supplementary Materials for sampling details). To 
remove potentially biasing incentives, all authors were ensured co-authorship regardless of their results, 
given preparatory tasks to familiarize them with the topic and asked to develop and pre-submit a 
research design to the PIs before running their tests. A total of 162 researchers in 73 teams submitted 
1,261 models and 88 substantive conclusions (with some teams drawing two different conclusions). 
Their code was checked and then anonymized for public sharing by the PIs (Figs. S1,S2 and Tables 
S1,S2). Many teams submitted 12 models testing how two different immigration measures predict 





Fig. 1 visualizes our central insight: extensive variation in reported results.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Broad variation in findings from 73 teams testing the same hypothesis with the 
same data 
The distribution of estimated average marginal effects (AME) across all converged models 
(N = 1,253) includes results that are negative (green, and in the direction predicted by the 
given hypothesis the teams were testing), not different from zero (grey) or positive 
(orange), using a 95% confidence interval. AME are XY-standardized. Y-axis contains two 
breaks at +/-0.05. Numbers inside circles represent the percentage of the distribution of 
each outcome inversely weighted by the number of models per team. 
 
 
We see the same pattern when we use the teams’ conclusions rather than their statistical results: 
Different participants drew vastly different conclusions from the same set of data (see Figs. S5,S9,S10). 
 
We find that competencies and potential confirmation biases do not explain the broad variation in 
outcomes.
 
Fig. 2 Researcher characteristics do not explain outcome variance between teams or within teams 
The distribution of team average of AMEs (left panel) and within-team variance in AMEs (right panel) 
across researchers grouped according to mean-splits (“LOWER” and “HIGHER”) on methodological 
and topic expertise (potential competencies bias), and on prior attitudes toward immigration and beliefs 
about whether the hypothesis is true (potential confirmation bias). Log variance shifted so that minimum 
log value equals zero. Teams submitting only one model assigned a variance of zero. Pearson 




Researcher characteristics show no significant association with statistical results or even substantive 
conclusions. We confirmed this by hand-coding each research report submitted by the participants to 
identify their modeling choices. Examining all 1,261 models revealed 166 model specifications used by 
at least one team. “Specification” here means a single component of a model, for example measurement 
strategy, estimator, hierarchical structure, choice of independent variables and potential subsetting of 
the data. Of these 166, we found 107 were present in more than two teams’ models, i.e., common 
 
specifications. Most strikingly, the varying presence of these 107 specifications in a dissimilarity matrix 
revealed that no two models were an identical combination of them (Table S11). 
 
Next we analyzed how much these specifications (“Research Design”) of the participants could explain 




Fig. 3 Variance in statistical results and substantive conclusions between and within teams is 
mostly unexplained by conditions, research design and researcher characteristics 
Decomposition of explained variance from multilevel general linear regression models using AMEs as 
the outcome (top three bars), and explained deviance from multinomial logistic regressions using the 
substantive conclusion(s) submitted by each team as a whole as to whether their results supported or 
rejected the hypothesis, or whether they thought the hypothesis was not testable given these data 
(bottom bar). We used informed step-wise addition of predictors to identify which specifications could 
explain the most variance/deviance while sacrificing the least degrees of freedom and maintaining the 
highest level of model fit based on log-likelihood and various information criteria; we also tested every 
possible combination as a robustness check. Equations, full regression results and definitions of all 
variables in “Main Regression Models” in Supplementary Materials. 
 
 
The yellow portions of the explained deviance/variance bars dominate Fig. 3. Research design (2.6%, 
green segment) and researcher characteristics (1.2%, blue segment) explain almost none of the total 
variance (top bar) in the numerical results; a similar story whether we look at variance within or between 
teams. In other words, the massive variation in reported results originated from unique or idiosyncratic 
steps in the data analysis process leaving 95.2% of the total variance in results unexplained. Substantive 
conclusions are somewhat better explained, but only little. Research design (10.0%) and researcher 
characteristics (8.8%) explain only a portion of the deviance in substantive conclusions (bottom bar) 
 
leaving 80.1% unexplained. Even the percentage of test results per team that statistically support their 
conclusions explain only about a third of the deviance (salmon-colored segment, bottom bar) leaving 
still 52.4% unexplained. 
 
We confirmed the robustness of our results by automatically assessing every possible combination of 
model specifications. We also ran separate regressions by dependent variable and a variance function 
regression to check if specifications impacted the variability of results within teams and correct for 
potential heteroscedasticity (Tables S4,S9-S11). All results support the conclusion that a large part of 
the variance in research outcomes is from idiosyncratic researcher variability - unique analytical 
pathways vis-a-vis the rest of the participants. 
 
To assess whether this unexplained variance can reasonably be considered ‘surprising’, we conducted 
a multiverse simulation suggesting that in a single workflow, model specifications can safely explain 
16% of effect variance using the same data. This is way more than the 2.6% from research designs or 
3.8% when including researcher characteristics, and it could be produced in a controlled setting using 
far fewer specifications (Table S8). Thus, further evidence that variations across workflows are unique. 
 
Summary 
The reliability of the results on which researchers base their conclusions is a central aspect of science 
to generate credible propositions and trustworthy solutions to problems. Much recent research focuses 
on systematic biases impacting reliability (publication bias, p-hacking, HARKing, etc.), yet we have 
little understanding of the more idiosyncratic sources of variation namely how much noise these sources 
introduce into the outcomes. Using a tightly controlled research design in a large-scale crowdsourced 
research effort involving 73 teams, we demonstrated that an ostensibly standardized and well-defined 
step in the research process – data analysis – can lead to substantial variation in statistical estimates and 
substantive conclusions. 
 
We call this variation idiosyncratic because we removed incentives to arrive at any particular results 
and because we identified and adjusted for common model specification choices across teams. We 
adjusted for methods and topical expertise (potential competency bias) and for prior attitudes and beliefs 
(potential confirmation bias). We accounted for 107 model specifications. We were left with a 
surprising amount of unexplained variance: 95.2% of the total variance in AMEs and 80.1% of the 
deviance in substantive conclusions (52.4% if we include the percentage of positive test results in each 
team, see Fig. 3). In other words, even highly skilled scientists motivated to come to accurate results 
varied tremendously in what they found based on the same data and hypothesis. 
 
 
These findings warrant discussion among those interested in meta-science and among the wider 
scientific community. If scientists are responsible for assessing and communicating uncertainty, they 
should address idiosyncratic variation. Their task is to measure a signal while attenuating noise as much 
as possible. Attenuation requires understanding the noise itself. Usually, this ‘noise’ is considered a 
product of instruments or alternative research designs. We conclude that if any given study had been 
conducted by a different (set of) researcher(s), perhaps even the same researchers at a different time, its 
results would likely have varied for reasons that cannot be reduced to easily identifiable analytical 
choices or biases. 
 
The decisions made by researchers are so minute that they do not appear as decisions but rather as non-
deliberate actions within the researcher’s standard research setting. Yet, as we have shown, they are far 
from trivial. This means that every step should be held up to stronger theoretical scrutiny. Researchers 
should explicate the (implicit) theoretical assumptions associated with each step, for example 
dichotomizing a variable or choosing a specific estimator, or even choice of software if this were to 
introduce some non-trivial disturbance in the results. 
 
Implications and limitations 
We do not know the transmutability of our ecological setting to different topics, disciplines or even 
datasets. For instance, we cannot say how much researcher variability would impact the analysis of 
experimental data where the data-generating model is much clearer to the analyst. Moreover, in the 
social sciences there are no Newtonian laws or definite quantum statistical likelihoods to work with, 
suggesting our case might be less conservative than a similar study in the natural sciences. We also 
consider that the particular hypothesis we selected for this study has no consensus in the social science 
literature(20–22). It remains to be seen whether these data are more or less prone than other data to 
idiosyncratic variance in scientific results. 
 
We see two implications for the current ‘reproducibility crisis’ narrative circulating across science. On 
the one hand, 15% of the teams had a majority of their statistical effects supporting the hypothesis (a 
negative estimate with a 95% CI, see Fig. S9) and 6.8% had a majority contradicting the hypothesis 
(positive/95% CI). This means that if publication is a rare event among a sample of researchers, random 
variation could easily lead to a universe of findings that are unambiguously in one direction or the other. 
If publication bias is a factor in this process(23), then the chance of this biased ‘universe’ of findings 
may increase simply as a product of noise in the research process. On the other hand, our findings 
suggest this ostensible crisis could be explained away as idiosyncratic variation inherent to the process 
of research, at least in theory. Thus, instead of a crisis, this would constitute a ‘new opportunity and 
challenge’ for scientific advancement(24). One such opportunity is to have even greater appreciation 
 
for findings that have a high degree of consensus, for example on anthropogenic climate change or 
confirmation of Einstein’s predictions from his Special Theory of Relativity. 
 
Conclusion 
Our study is the first to observe the mechanics of the data analysis process among social scientists at 
this level of detail. We find that a hidden source of noise may have major consequences for the reliability 
of scientific findings. If nothing else, scientists and consumers of their research should be humbler and 
cautious about the reliability of their findings. As we observed it here, idiosyncratic researcher 
variability is a phenomenon that should lead researchers to be more aware and embracing of the 
uncertainties permeating their work.  
 
As our conclusions derive from myriad seemingly minor analytical decisions, just like the researchers 
we observed, we encourage readers to scrutinize these decisions as potentially non-trivial. Thus we 
provide replication files and an interactive tool (‘Shiny app’) to further explore the robustness checks 
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